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TEXAS OPEN RECORDS ACT: LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES' INVESTIGATORY RECORDS
by J. Graham Hill
The Texas Open Records Act1 was adopted by the Sixty-Third Texas Legis-
lature and signed by Texas Governor Dolph Briscoe on June 14, 1973.2
The underlying public policy of TORA is that all persons are entitled to full
and complete information regarding the affairs of state government and the
official acts of those who represent the people of Texas as public officials
and employees.3 Pursuant to this policy, TORA provides a comprehensive
disclosure statute which elucidates the mechanism for public access to state
governmental records.
Under TORA, a public record is the portion of all documents, writings,
letters, memoranda, or other written, printed, typed, copied, or developed
material which contains public information. 4 All information collected,
assembled, or maintained by governmental bodies5 pursuant to a statutory
directive or the transaction of official business is public information, subject
to sixteen exceptions. 6 Additionally, fifteen categories of information are
1. Access by Public to Information in Custody of Governmental Agencies and
Bodies Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Supp. 1974). The Act is com-
monly referred to as the Texas Open Records Act or TORA.
2. Id. § 15.
3. Id. § 1.
4. Id. § 2(2). A public record has been defined in other jurisdictions as a
document which is required by law to be kept in the discharge of a public duty. Mat-
thews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952); Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152
N.W.2d 833 (1967); Charleston Mail Ass'n v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 766, 143 S.E.2d 136(1965). It is the nature and the purpose of the document, rather than the custodian,
which is determinative as to a document's status as public or confidential. Linder v.
Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152 N.W.2d 833, 835 (1967).
5. "Governmental body" is defined by TORA as:(A) any board, commission, department, committee, institution,
agency, or office within the executive or legislative branch of the state
government, or which is created by either the executive or legislative
branch of the state government, and which is under the direction of one or
more elected or appointed members;(B) the commissioners court of each county and the city council or
governing body of each city in the state;
(C) every deliberative body having rule-making or quasi-judicial power
and classified as a department, agency, or political subdivision of a county
or city;(D) the board of trustees of every school district, and every county
board of school trustees and county board of education;(E) the governing board of every special district;(F) the part, section, or portion of every organization, corporation,
commission, committee, institution, or agency which is supported in whole
or in part by public funds, or which expends public funds. Public funds
as used herein shall mean funds of the State of Texas or any governmen-
tal subdivision thereof;(G) the Judiciary is not included within this definition.
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(1) (Supp. 1974).
6. The exceptions are:(1) information deemed confidential by law, either Constitutional, stat-
utory, or by judicial decision;(2) information in personnel files, the disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, how-
ever, that all information in personnel files of an individual employee
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explicitly classified as public information. 7
within a governmental body is to be made available to that individual em-
ployee or his designated representative as is public information under this
Act;(3) information relating to litigation of a criminal or civil nature and
settlement negotiations, to which the state or political subdivision is, or
may be, a party, or to which an officer or employee of the state or politi-
cal subdivision, as a consequence of his office or employment, is or may
be a party, that the attorney general or the respective attorneys of the
various political subdivisions has determined should be withheld from pub-
lic inspection;(4) information which, if released, would give advantage to competi-
tors or bidders;(5) information pertaining to the location of real or personal property
for public purposes prior to public announcement of the project, and infor-
mation pertaining to appraisals or purchase price of real or personal prop-
erty for public purposes prior to the formal award of contracts therefor;
(6) drafts and working papers involved in the preparation of proposed
legislation;(7) matters in which the duty of the Attorney General of Texas or an
attorney of a political subdivision, to his client, pursuant to the Rules and
Canons of Ethics of the State Bar of Texas are prohibited from disclosure,
or which by order of a court are prohibited from disclosure;
(8) records of law enforcement agencies that deal with the detection
and investigation of crime and the internal records and notations of such
law enforcement agencies which are maintained for internal use in matters
relating to law enforcement;
(9) private correspondence and communications of an elected office
holder relating to matters the disclosure of which would constitute an in-
vasion of privacy;
(10) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential by statute or judicial decision;
(11) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than one in litigation with the
agency;
(12) information contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions, and/
or securities, as that term is defined in the Texas Securities Act;
(13) geological and geophysical information and data including maps
concerning wells, except information filed in connection with 'an applica-
tion or proceeding before any agency;
(14) student records at educational institutions funded wholly, or in
part, by state revenue; but such records shall be made available upon re-
quest of educational institution personnel, the student involved, or that stu-
dent's parent, legal guardian, or spouse;
(15) birth and death records maintained by the Bureau of Vital Statis-
tics in the State of Texas;
(16) the audit working papers of the State Auditor.
Id. § 3(a).
7. The following categories are public information:
(1) reports, audits, evaluations, and investigations made of, for, or by,
governmental bodies upon completion;
(2) the names, sex, ethnicity, salaries, title, and dates of employment
of all employees and officers of governmental bodies;
(3) information in any account, voucher, or contract dealing with the
receipt or expenditure of public or other funds by governmental bodies,
not otherwise made confidential by law;(4) the names of every official and the final record of voting on all
proceedings in governmental bodies;(5) all working papers, research material, and information used to
make estimates of the need for, or expenditure of, public funds or taxes by
any governmental body, upon completion of such estimates;
(6) the name, place of business, and the name of the city to which lo-
cal sales and use taxes are credited, if any, for the named person, or
persons reporting or paying sales and use taxes under the Limited Sales,
Excise and Use Tax Act;
(7) descriptions of an agency's central and field organization and the
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Upon written application by any person for public information, the
custodian of such information must promptly produce the documents for
inspection and duplication." If a governmental unit determines that the
requested information falls within one of the categories exempted from
disclosure, the unit may within ten days request that the Attorney General of
Texas 9 determine whether the information is public or confidential. 10 If the
public entity refuses to request an attorney general's opinion or to supply
requested material which has been defined by the attorney general as public,
the party desiring the material may seek a writ of mandamus in state court
for a determination of whether disclosure should be compelled."
It would be premature to predict if the governmental units of Texas will
be cooperative or recalcitrant vis-A-vis public requests for disclosure of
documents. However, based on experience with the Federal Freedom of
Information Act,' 2 a significant amount of litigation will most likely arise
under the Texas Open Records Act.' 3 This is due primarily to the fact that
established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed
service, the members) from whom, and the methods whereby, the public
may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;(8) statements of the general course and method by which an agency's
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and require-
ments of all formal and informal procedures available;(9) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at
which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and con-
tents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(10) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applica-
bility formulated and adopted by the agency;(I 1) each amendment, revisions, or repeal of 7, 8, 9 and 10 above;
(12) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as
well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(13) statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted
by the agency;
(14) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public;
(15) information currently regarded by agency policy as open to the
public.
Id. § 6(a).
8. The cost of reproducing public records is determined by the state Board of Con-
trol. Id. § 9(a). Each governmental body may promulgate reasonable rules and regu-
lations of procedure by which public records may be inspected efficiently, safely, and
without delay. Id. § 13.
9. Id. § 7. The role of the Texas Attorney General in the disclosure process is
a feature distinguishing TORA from the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(1970). Under the federal Act, all controversies must be resolved exclusively in federal
district court in de novo proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). The United States
Attorney General is not required to issue an opinion concerning the disclosure or non-
disclosure of specific federal records. However, in June 1967 United States Attorney
General Ramsey Clark released a forty-seven page report which analyzed the Freedom
of Information Act. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFOR-
MATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT III (1967), reprinted in 20
AD. L. REV. 263 (1967).
10. Distributing confidential information is a misdemeanor punishable by confine-
ment not exceeding six months and/or a fine not exceeding $1,000.00. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 10 (Supp. 1974).
11. Id. § 8. If the attorney general determines that the information is not required
to be released, the statute fails to provide a remedy for the party seeking the records.
Thus, in certain instances, the state's chief legal officer may be the final arbiter of dis-
putes.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
13. See Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 1 (1970).
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justification for confidentiality must be based upon one of TORA's amor-
phous exceptions. 14
The purpose of this Comment is analysis of the countervailing policy
considerations of the personal right of privacy, the governmental need for
secrecy, and the public's right to know in the context of TORA's exemption
from disclosure of the records of law enforcement agencies.'" For example,
are criminal and civil enforcement files within the scope of this exemption?
Should files which will not be used in pending litigation be exempt from
disclosure? Finally, solutions will be proposed for the problems which will be
encountered by the Texas courts in applying TORA in this area.
I. A CONFLICT OF PUBLIC POLICY GOALS
The implementation of TORA results in the confrontation of three
fundamental rights: (1) the public's right to know, (2) the individual's right
to privacy, and (3) the state's need for secrecy. The application of this
legislation requires the delicate balancing of the need of government to
obtain and retain information needed to enforce the laws, the interest of each
individual to control the gathering and use of information about him, and the
right of the public to be informed about the activities of government.
The Public's Right To Be Informed. To assure government by and for the
people, the polity must have the opportunity to inspect public documents in
order to assess whether their public officials are honestly, faithfully, and
competently conducting the affairs of state. 16 James Madison declared, "A
popular government, without popular information, or means of acquiring it,
is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both.' u7 The means for
achieving public access to federal documents is the Federal Freedom of
Information Act.' 8 This Act was intended to increase public participation in
government through imposition of liberal disclosure requirements limited
only by specific, narrowly constructed exemptions.' 9 The Act was passed to
provide the necessary machinery to assure the availability of governmental
information necessary to an informed electorate 20 by piercing the paper
curtain of the federal bureaucracy that covers public mismanagement with
public misinformation and secret sins with secret silence.2 ' As President
Lyndon B. Johnson asserted as he signed the Freedom of Information Act, a
democracy works best when the people have all the information that the
security of the nation permits. 22
.14. See note 6 supra.
15. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Supp. 1974).
16. See, e.g., MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961).
17. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in THE COMPLETE
MADISON 377 (Sam K. Padover ed. 1953).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
19. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. The Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); H.R.
REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
21. 112 CONG. RE C. 13,648 (1966) (remarks of Congressman Laird).
22. Presidential address of July 4, 1966, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1080, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1972).
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The public's right to be informed of state governmental affairs has been
recognized as essential to the democratic process in Texas. 23 The machinery
for achieving this policy goal is TORA,24 whose purpose is to insure the
maximum possible public access to governmental documents. 25
The Individual's Right to Privacy. While all citizens have a general interest
in securing an efficient and honest government, each individual in a democ-
racy also has a right to protect himself against unreasonable disclosures
through the governmental process. 26 The United States Supreme Court has
held that the right of personal privacy is guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.27
A common law right to privacy was first recognized by the Supreme Court
of Texas in Billings v. Atkinson.28 The plaintiff brought an action for
invasion of privacy against the defendant, an employee of Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, for attaching a wire-tap device to the plaintiff's private
telephone line.29 In holding for the plaintiff, the court defined the right of
privacy as:
The right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation
of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which
-the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental
suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.30
23. Texas State Representative Lane Denton, speaking on the floor of the Texas
House of Representatives, Feb. 12, 1973. Transcript on file with the legislative counsel.
24. Randall Wood, Texas Director of Common Cause, addressing the Texas House
of Representatives, Feb. 12, 1973. Transcript on file with the legislative counsel.
25. Texas State Speaker of the House Price Daniel, Jr., testifying before the Texas
Attorney General's Opinions Committee, Jan. 21, 1974. Transcript on file with the leg-
islative counsel.
26. Development of the individual is particularly important in a democratic society,
since the qualities of independent thought, diversity of views and non-conformity are
considered desirable traits. Independence requires time for sheltered conduct, and for
the opportunity to alter opinions before making them public. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 34 (1967).
27. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
28. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973). Prior to Billings Texas courts had expressly re-
jected the theory that a right of privacy existed at common law. McCullagh v. Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954);
Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1952, no writ); see also Note, A New Chapter in Texas Tort Law-The Right of Privacy,
10 Hous. L. REV. 1176 (1973,); Note, The Right of Privacy is Recognized in Texas,
5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 345 (1973); Note, Billings v. Atkinson: Texas Recognizes Invasion
of the Right of Privacy as an Actionable Tort, 27 Sw. L.J. 865 (1973); Note, Texas
Supreme Court Allows Recovery for an Unauthorized Wiretap Under the Theory of In-
vasion of Privacy, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 224 (1973).
29. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
30. Id. at 859. With this decision Texas followed the lead of the vast majority of
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So.
2d 474 (1964); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971); Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co., 3 Conn. Cir. 716, 223 A.2d 405 (1966);
Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Cabaniss v. Hips-
ley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View
Estates, 50 Hawaii 374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968); Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill. App.
2d 29, 213 N.E.2d 39 (1965); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86
N.E.2d 306 (1949). Only three states do not recognize the existence of the right to
1975]
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The court stated that the violation of the right to privacy constituted a legal
injury for which a remedy will be granted.3' Further, the court decided that
damages for mental suffering are recoverable without a showing of actual
physical injury in an invasion of privacy action.82
Prosser has categorized the right of privacy as follows:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion, solitude or private affairs.
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
(4) Appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name
or likeness. 8 '
Once the plaintiff proves that the defendant's activities fall within one of
these four categories, damages are presumed.34 Even if the defendant's
publication reveals true facts about the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct is
actionable.' 5 The only defense available to the defendant is express or
implied consent.36
When a matter of public concern is involved, the courts do not always
accord the plaintiff a right to recovery, even though his privacy has been
invaded. Basing their opinions on the constitutional protection of free speech
and press,' 7 the courts have held that a privilege must exist for publishing
matters of public concern so long as the report is made without the
knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of the truth.38 Matters of
privacy. Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Henry
v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430,
75 N.W.2d 925 (1956). The common law right to privacy, as a personal rather than a
property or contractual right, was first proposed in a law review article. Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
31. 489 S.W.2d at 860. In Cullum v. Government Employees Financial Corp., 517
S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court refused to ex-
tend the Billings doctrine to a situation where a creditor informed the debtor's employer
of the debt. Unauthorized appropriation recognized in Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA,
521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. 489 S.W.2d at 861.
33. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804-15 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
34. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 528-29 (1973).
35. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffee, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Cason
v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp.,
80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950); Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,
402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d
291 (1942); Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956);
Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
36. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
921 (1958); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Molton v. Com-
mercial Credit Corp., 127 Ga. App. 390, 193 S.E.2d 629 (1972); Eason v. J. Weingar-
ten, Inc., 219 So. 2d 516 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The
Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974).
38. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill the plaintiff instituted an ac-
tion for damages based on the false report by the defendant that a new play was based
upon the experiences of the plaintiff. The Court held that the New York right to pri-
vacy statute could not redress false reports of matters of public interest absent a showing
that the defendant published with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth. Id. at 387-88. This rule has been consistently followed by the courts. Cantrell
v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing
Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Estate
of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d
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public concern encompass newsworthy occurrences of general public inter-
est 9 and the activities of public figures. 40 A public figure has been defined
as one who, by his accomplishments, fame or mode of living, or adoption of
a profession or calling, gives the public a legitimate interest in his affairs and
his character. 41 It is held that a person who engages in public affairs has
waived his right to privacy. 42 However, after a length of time, a public
person can return to private life or a public event can lose its timeliness, at
which point a person regains his right of privacy. 43
A public official's right of privacy must also yield when recovery would be
contrary to the public interest. In the recent Texas court of civil appeals case
of Richardson v. City of Pasadena,44 a police officer attempted to set aside
an order of the Pasadena Civil Service Commission which had dismissed
him from the force for refusing to take a polygraph test.45 The court held
771 (1968); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
39. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975)
(story of rape and killing of plaintiffs daughter); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting
Div.-Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (broadcast of plaintiff's
arrest, even though he was later released without any charges being brought against
him); however, the courts have held that certain stories were not public events.
Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969) (film which
showed mentally ill inmates at a correctional institution in the nude, where the inmates
had not given written releases); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162
So. 2d 474 (1964) (picture showing plaintiff at country fair fun-house with her dress
blown up by an air jet).
40. The United States Supreme Court has held that a wide variety of personages
were public figures. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (city mayor
and candidate for tax assessor); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (police offi-
cial); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (candidate for United States
Senate); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (promi-
nent local real estate developer and builder and a state legislator); St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S.
81 (1967) (clerk of a state court); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
(retired army general); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (college
football coach); on the other hand, numerous plaintiffs have not qualified as public
figures. Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947) (mere fact that plaintiff
had written and distributed a novel did not support the contention that he was a public
figure); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958)
(wife of murdered detective); In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957) (picture of convicted murderer in courthouse prior to sen-
tencing). See Symposium-The Press, Privacy, and "Public" Figures, 12 VILL. L. REv.
725 (1967).
41. Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
42. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971); McQueen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488, 161 S.E.2d 63, rev'd on other grounds,
224 Ga. 420, 162 S.E.2d 313 (1968); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23
N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
43. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (story about plaintiffs
life as a prostitute, after she had led'an exemplary life for seven years); Dingee v. Phila-
delphia Daily News, 328 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1964) (story published two years after plain-
tiff's arrest on abortion charges). On the other hand, the courts have determined in
other cases that the event was still of public interest. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951) (story published 15 years after plaintiff had been prose-
cutor in the John Dillinger trial); Rozhon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 230 F.2d 359
(7th Cir. 1956) (story of plaintiff's son's death from narcotics five months after the
event); Raynor v. American Broadcasting Co., 222 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (story
of criminal act 20 months after plaintiff was sentenced); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App.
2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949) (story about boxer 10 years after he had abandoned his
career).
44. 500 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 513 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1974).
45. 500 S.W.2d at 176.
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that while a private citizen could refuse to take the polygraph test on the
grounds that it was a violation of his right to privacy, a public employee's
right of privacy is not recognized where it conflicts with the public interest.4"
As the plaintiff's refusal to take the polygraph test reduced the credibility
and efficiency of the police force, the court determined that the public
interest outweighed the public employee's right to privacy. 47
Governmental Requirement of Secrecy. The final policy consideration under
TORA is the need for governmental secrecy in certain circumstances. The
state secrets doctrine, as it has emerged, sanctions the withholding of any
information the secrecy of which is deemed to be in the national interest.
The first United States Supreme Court case on this issue was Totten v. United
States,48 wherein the court refused to compel the disclosure of a secret
government contract during the Civil War, since a contrary holding would
endanger governmental military and diplomatic operations. 49
The question of governmental privilege arose in the case of United States
v. Reynolds,50 which involved a wrongful death action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 51 The plaintiffs requested documents containing statements
taken in connection with an official investigation of the accident that were in
the custody of the Secretary of the Air Force. 52 The request for production
was denied by the Government.5" The United States Supreme Court ruled
that the privilege of non-disclosure by the Government of military or
diplomatic secrets is well established, 54 and it was error for the district court
to compel disclosure, since there was a reasonable danger that the requested
documents contained military secrets. 55
The privilege of secrecy was invoked by President Richard M. Nixon in
response to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the special prosecutor for the
production of tape recordings. In United States v. Nixon56 the Court
recognized a need for confidentiality in order to encourage candid, objective,
and even blunt or harsh opinions in presidential discussions, for the chief
executive and his aides must be free to examine all policy alternatives.57
However, the privilege is not absolute. 58 The President's generalized interest
in confidentiality, unsupported by a need to protect military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets, could not prevail over specific judicial need
for the documents.
5 9
46. Id. at 177.
47. Id. In Richardson v. Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1974), the supreme court
reversed the court of civil appeals on the theory that the closed hearing conducted by
the city civil service commission was a violation of the plaintiff's right to procedural
due process. Id. at 4.
48. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
49. Id.
50. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
52. 345 U.S. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 6-7.
55. Id. at 10-11; accord, Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
56. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
57. Id. at 708.
58. Id. at 707.
59. Id. at 713.
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. II. RECORDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: AN ILLUSTRATION
The public policy precepts of individual privacy, governmental secrecy,
and the public's right to know collide under the law enforcement agency
disclosure exemption of TORA. This exception to public disclosure states
that "records of law enforcement agencies that deal with the detection and
investigation of crime and the internal records and notations of such law
enforcement agencies which are maintained for internal use in matters
related to law enforcement" are not subject to public review under TORA.6 0
The public policy goals set forth above are clearly illustrated in the
application of this exemption under TORA. First, law enforcement agencies
have a need to conduct investigations of possible criminal activity in secrecy
to insure effective enforcement of the state laws. If their files were open to
the public, a person who has violated or intends to violate the law might
avoid prosecution or detection by law enforcement officers. On the other
hand, there are numerous examples of investigatory files which contain
information in which the public has a legitimate interest. For example, the
public has the right to know the crime rate in different sections of the state,
the number of apprehensions of law violators by law enforcement officers,
the disposition of criminal cases, and so forth. Further, each private person
investigated and every private individual who assists law enforcement agen-
cies has a right to be protected by the state from unwarranted invasions and
public revelations concerning their private affairs. Thus, in each factual
situation, the competing interests of the law enforcement agency, the public,
and the affected individual must be balanced to determine whether the
records should be made public or remain confidential.
The first request under TORA for public disclosure of law enforcement
records, which resulted in an attorney general's opinion, 61 was made by the
Houston Post, a major metropolitan newspaper. The Post demanded that
Houston Airport Security arrest records from January 1, 1973, to the present
be made public.62 The city of Houston denied access to the records and
requested a determination of the issue by the Texas Attorney General. 63 On
January 15, 1974, the attorney general ruled that: (1) The Houston Airport
Security Police was a law enforcement agency; (2) the arrest records at
issue dealt with the detection and investigation of crime; and (3) the
records were maintained for internal use by the agency in matters relating to
law enforcement. 4 As such, the information sought by the Houston Post was
protected from public disclosure by TORA. 65
60. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Supp. 1974).
61. OPEN REcoRDs DECISION No. 18 (Jan. 15, 1974).
62. Id. at 1. Specifically, the Post wanted to ascertain the name, age, address, of-
fense and disposition of each case. In addition to the requested material, the arrest rec-
ords contained detailed information regarding the detection of crime. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The legislative history of TORA supports OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 18
(Jan. 15, 1974). On April 6, 1973, the following exchange took place at a meeting of
the Senate Jurisprudence Committee:
Senator Braecklein: 'Well, what I am concerned with is an arrest record
that does not result in any final conviction... . I don't think that should
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
This opinion resulted in such a public outcry that a quasi-judicial hearing
was held in Austin, Texas, on January 21, 1974, by the Texas Attorney
General's office. After testimony was received from representatives of the
press, the legislature, law enforcement agencies, and the general public, a
clarifying opinion was issued on March 25, 1974.66 Although the specific
holding of the original opinion was affirmed, the attorney general took the
opportunity to expand that holding in the subsequent opinion.67 The opinion
noted that Texas State Representative Lane Denton, who was one of the
principal sponsors of TORA, had stated that an arrest record was not subject
to disclosure to the public. 68 However, the attorney general decided that
even though TORA did not compel disclosure of arrest records, investigatory
agencies could allow public access to such documents, if the right to privacy
is preserved. Therefore, a law enforcement agency could waive its right to
secrecy.6 9 Further, specific information such as the name, address, and
offense of the arrestee and the disposition of the case should be, in the
opinion of the attorney general, disclosed to the public by the custodian of
such records. The remaining portion of the files should be kept secret.70
Although the attorney general stated that he was affirming the original
opinion with the subsequent opinion,71 he was, in reality, overruling himself.
In the initial opinion, the entire arrest record information was exempt from
public disclosure, 72 while the second opinion ruled that specific information
contained in the record was to be disclosed to the public.73 In the discussion,
the attorney general acknowledged the competing policy goals of right to
privacy and public right to know. 74 He attempted to accommodate these two
goals by distinguishing between general factual data, such as name, address,
and offense of the arrestee which should be made public, 75 and other data,
such as the identities of undercover agents, procedures of law enforcement
personnel in undercover maneuvers, and so forth, which should be kept
secret.7 6 Certainly, the public has a right to know basic facts concerning
alleged criminal events, such as the names of the participants and ensuing
police action. The mere reporting of such information would not constitute
an invasion of privacy, for alleged criminal activity is a public event. 77
Further, the release of this basic data would not seriously hamper law
enforcement efficiency in performing its public mission. As the second
be made public.'
Representative Denton: 'And I feel that it is definitely confidential in
terms of this bill [TORA].'
Transcript on file with the legislative counsel.
66. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 18A (March 25, 1974).
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2.
72. OPEN REcORlS DECISION No. 18 (Jan. 15, 1974).
73. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 18A (March 25, 1974).
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id. at 9.
77. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
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opinion accommodated the conflicting policy considerations, it reflects better
judgment.
Another significant attorney general's opinion involved the Retail Credit
Company's request that the city of Pasadena release a police officer's offense
report concerning a named individual.78 The opinion stated that the disclo-
sure of such information was covered by the investigatory files exemption of
TORA and would constitute an invasion of the right of privacy. 79 This
opinion appears to be inconsistent with a later decision of the attorney
general dealing with the city of El Paso police accident reports. 80 However,
the El Paso opinion noted that accident reports must be prepared by police
officers and submitted to the Texas Department of Public Safety,8 ' and that
such reports are to be available to the public as a matter of law.
82
Therefore, the city police accident reports should be made public, regardless
of the fact that they are still in the control of the city.83
In addition to the statutory basis mentioned above, the two opinions may
be distinguished upon right of privacy considerations. In the Pasadena
opinion the requested information concerned one named individual. Al-
though the opinion does not reveal the report's contents, the report may have
contained material of a highly objectionable nature.8 4 Further, the informa-
tion was requested by a credit company for the presumed purpose of
conducting a credit check on the individual. Certainly, this is not related to
TORA's goal of public monitoring of governmental officials.85 In contrast,
the El Paso decision involved routine traffic accident reports which are
documents prepared in the discharge of a public employee's legal duty and,
thus, are public records. Further, the public has a legitimate interest in
highway safety, and as the information relates to public events and is not
highly objectionable, the individual's right of privacy must be subordinated.
The state's efficiency in investigating and prosecuting alleged violators would
not be sacrificed in this instance, because the participants in the accident are
fully aware of their involvement in the investigatory proceedings of the
78. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 19 (Jan. 15, 1974).
79. Id. at 1.
80. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 43 (Aug. 16, 1974).
81. Id. at 1.
82. Id. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 47 (1969) provides for public ac-
cess to accident reports submitted after Jan. 1, 1970. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 84
(May 5, 1975) held that accident reports submitted prior to that date were exempted
from disclosure to the public. However, even though the reports themselves are confi-
dential, the attorney general ruled in OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 88 (May 14, 1975)
that the fact of whether or not a person had filed an accident report prior to Jan. 1,
1970 was public information.
83. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 43 (Aug. 16, 1974). The information was also
not excepted from disclosure by TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(3)
(Supp. 1974), as information relating to civil litigation. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No.
43 (Aug. 16, 1974).
84. This statement is reasonably inferable from the opinion's reference to Billings
v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1973). OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 19 (Jan. 15,
1974). For discussion of Billings see notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
85. Daniel, supra note 25. However, the custodian cannot inquire into the reasons
for a person's request for records. Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 5(b)
(Supp. 1974). The courts may inquire. Industrial Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation
of the S., No. 7717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont, July 10, 1975) (not yet reported).
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police. In balancing the interests, it would appear that the scale is tipped in
favor of public disclosure.
The police manual of the University of Texas Special Services-Security
Division was the subject of another attorney general's opinion.80 The opinion
held that the Texas Legislature intended to distinguish in TORA between
administrative and law enforcement records,8 7 and as the requested records
were of both types, the attorney general reasoned that the administrative
material should be revealed,88 while the law enforcement records should
remain confidential.89 This opinion reflects a careful balancing between the
public's right to know and the state's need for secrecy in order to promote
efficient enforcement of the laws. Specific distinctions were made in the
opinion between types of administrative materials for the purpose of deter-
mining what should be made public.90 Unless the administrative data is
related to specific operations or equipment of the police force or the
identities of undercover officers, the material is to be made public.9 ' This
approach adequately accommodated the competing interests involved in the
controversy.
The Texas Department of Public Welfare's protective services records
pertaining to complaints of child neglect and abuse were ruled to be
exempted from disclosure in another important attorney general's opinion.92
The law enforcement section was applicable as the welfare department's
investigation was conducted on behalf of a law enforcement agency to
determine whether criminal prosecution was warranted.98 Thus, public
revelation of the information would have serverely hampered the detection
and prosecution of child abuse. 94 Further, the opinion noted that the
requested material fell within the ambit of family privacy which is pro-
tected by the United States Constitution,9" and for this reason should not
be disclosed. 96
Without comment or analysis, the attorney general has recently ruled that
a criminal investigation report of the bail bond industry was clearly exempt-
ed from disclosure by the law enforcement section9 7 and letters pertaining to
an investigation of alleged violations of the Texas Real Estate License Act 98
were public information.99 The distinction between these records is difficult
to perceive from the facts presented by the opinions. If the bail bond
86. OPEN REcoRDs DECISION No. 22A (June 6, 1974).
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id.
92. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 73 (March 27, 1975).
93. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. art. 34.05 (1975) provides that the Department of Wel-
fare must compile and forward these records to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
94. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 49 (Sept. 9, 1974) recognized the common law
privilege of protecting the identity of informers of child abuse. The opinion stated that
the rule promoted the effective detection of crime.
95. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
96. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 73 (March 27, 1975).
97. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 79 (April 10, 1975).
98. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (1969).
99. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 80 (April 11, 1975).
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investigatory report contained the identity of informants, information regard-
ing the methods of detecting bail bond violators, facts to be used in future
litigation, and so forth, the opinion was clearly correct. However, the opinion
does not reveal such facts. Hopefully, future opinions will better clarify the
rationale for disclosing or exempting records under TORA.
The only court decision in Texas based upon the law enforcement
exemption of TORA is Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of
Houston.100 The plaintiff's request for access to all offense reports and
individual criminal records of the Houston Police Department had been
denied by the defendants on the ground that the material was exempt from
disclosure under TORA. 1°1 The court permanently enjoined the city of
Houston from denying the plaintiff the information based upon TORA, 102
but also determined that TORA did not affirmatively grant the plaintiff
access to the material. 10 3 Additionally, the court held the law enforcement
agency records exemption, inter alia, was void and unenforceable.10 4 The
decision is presently pending before the court of civil appeals.' 0 5
The correct disposition of the Houston Chronicle case would have been to
allow the plaintiffs access to the name, address, and offense of each arrestee,
and the disposition of each case. First, the legislative intent and the mandate
of TORA support disclosure of the information. Under TORA, government
records -are presumed to be public and the Act is to be liberally construed in
favor of disclosure. 0 6 Second, the automatic exemption of any data which is
labeled "investigatory" constitutes an unconstitutional infringement upon the
freedom of the press, as governmental denial of newsworthy information
whether directly or indirectly is constitutionally invalid, 107 without a showing
of a compelling state need.' 08 In balancing these policies, the public's
interest in disclosure must prevail. It is speculative that as a general rule the
dissemination of limited information concerning criminal activity would
seriously impair the enforcement of the laws. In contrast, the press has the
highest duty to report the news with respect to public events, 10 9 such as the
100. No. 985,531 (Dist. Ct. of Harris County, 125th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug.
29, 1974).
101. Id. at 2. See notes 61-77 supra and accompanying text for discussion regarding
the role of the Texas Attorney General in this controversy.
102. No. 985,531 (Dist. Ct. of Harris County, 125th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug.
29, 1974).
103. Id.
104. Id. Specifically, the court held that four sections of TORA were overbroad,
vague, in conflict with each other, and an unauthorized delegation of legislative power.
The four sections were: (1) reports, audits, evaluations, and investigations made of, for,
or by governmental bodies which are public records upon completion. TEx. Rav. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 6(a)(1) (Supp. 1974); (2) information currently regarded
by agency policy as open to the public, which is public information. Id. § 6(a)(15);(3) information considered confidential by law, which is exempt from disclosure. Id.
§ 3(a)(1); and (4) records of law enforcement agencies that deal with the detection
and investigation of crime and the internal records and notation of such enforcement
agencies which are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement,
which are exempt from public disclosure. Id. § 3(a) (8).
105. No. 985,531 (Dist. Ct. of Harris County, 125th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug.
29, 1974). Oral arguments were held in the court of civil appeals on Feb. 12, 1975.
106. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 14(d) (Supp. 1974).
107. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
108. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
109. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
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apprehension of a suspect. Finally, the publication of limited factual data is a
minor invasion of privacy when contrasted with the need of society to be
informed of public events. Therefore, the general rule should be that limited
information concerning alleged criminal activity should be subject to public
disclosure. However, if the state can show that the disclosure would signifi-
cantly impede the enforcement of the laws or constitute an unwarranted
invasion of an individual's right to privacy, the court may, after an in camera
inquiry, hold that the documents should be exempt from disclosure.
III. TORA AND INVESTIGATORY FILES: A LOOK AHEAD
In terms of future problems that Texas will confront in applying TORA, a
review of the case law under the Federal Freedom of Information Act's
provision for exemption from disclosure of investigatory files is instruc-
tive.110  TORA was modeled after the federal Act;"' consequently, the
policies and procedures of the two acts are very similar. 1 2 Additionally,
TORA's section on law enforcement records is almost identical to the
Freedom of Information Act's provision for investigatory files. The federal
Act provides for the non-disclosure of investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent the information is available by
law to a party other than an agency.' l3 The general policy underlying this
exception is to prevent premature disclosures to a defendant in a federal
enforcement proceeding, 1 4 to enhance the detection of federal statutory
violations, 115 to protect the privacy of citizens who are being investigat-
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970).
111. Texas State Representative Lane Denton, one of the sponsors of TORA, address-
ing the Texas House of Representatives, Feb. 13, 1973. Transcript on file with the leg-
islative counsel.
112. For detailed treatment of the Freedom of Information Act, see Amoroso, The
Freedom of Information Act: Shredding the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 694
1973); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761
1967); Hoerster, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpreta-
tions, 44 WASH. L. REV. 641 (1969); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and
Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1261 (1970); Salomon
& Wechsler, The Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 150 (1969); Waples, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven Year Assess-
ment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). This section was amended by the 93rd Con-
gress, 2d Session on Nov. 21, 1974. The provision presently provides for
nondisclosure of investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses, but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confi-
dential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law en-
forcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation,
confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E)
disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life
or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. 1974). The 1975 amendment will not be analyzed in this
Comment. As the new section will not be effective until March 1975, there is an ab-
sence of case law. Further, the 1975 amendment is substantially different from TORA.
Thus, the new law would not provide any assistance regarding the application of TORA
by the courts, which is the purpose of this Comment.
114. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282
F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969).
115. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813
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ed, 116 and to provide information to the federal government in their
inquiries.' 17
A. Civil and Criminal Law Files
The courts are in general agreement that the investigatory file exception of
the Freedom of Information Act applies to files prepared for both criminal
and civil enforcement actions,"" although one commentator has stated that
the statutory language and the legislative history of the federal Act leave
room for doubt on this issue.1 9 Although TORA clearly includes criminal
actions within the exemption, the Act does not expressly cover civil files of
regulatory agencies.120 The Texas courts may adopt a restricted application
of the exemption based upon legislative history' 2' or public policy. 122 If the
Texas courts apply TORA literally, thereby restricting applicability to crimi-
nal files, the Texas Legislature should amend the Act to include the civil
investigatory files of regulatory agencies in the exemption. The policy
reasons for non-disclosure of criminal investigatory files are applicable to
civil investigatory records. The state has a legitimate interest in preventing
premature disclosure of civil investigatory records in order to enhance the
detection of law violators and enforcement of regulatory laws. If these
agencies' files are held to fall within the scope of the exemption, a number of
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1971).
116. Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D.
Cal. 1971),
117. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824(1970); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
118. Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th
Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.824 (1970); B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Pilar v. SS
Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1972); Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp.540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), af 'd, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969). This position is clearly
supported by the legislative history of the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1966).
119. Katz, supra note 112, at 1277.
120. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Supp. 1974).
121. The legislative intent is shrouded with doubt. In response to a question before
the Senate Jurisprudence Committee on April 10, 1973, Texas State Representative Lane
Denton stated that agencies which act in a quasi-judicial capacity such as the Insurance
Commission, the Water Quality Board, the Air Control Board, the State Securities Board
and the Industrial Accident Board are covered by this section. During the senate floor
debate on May 17, 1973, Senator William Meier stated that the exception included the
Alcoholic Beverage Commission, the Parks and Wildlife Department and other agencies
charged with the enforcement of criminal statutes. Transcripts on file with the legisla-
tive counsel. Speaking before the 1 1th Annual Conference of the Texas and New Mex-
ico Association of College and University Traffic and Security Departments, William
Reid, a member of the Attorney General's Opinion Committee stated that the law en-
forcement exemption would probably be restricted to uniformed services. The Attorney
General has ruled that the Special Services Security Division of the University of Texasis included within the exemption. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 22A (June 6, 1974).
The issue of whether the Air Control Board was a law enforcement agency was avoided
in TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-276 (1974). OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 27 (April
11, 1974) held that inspection reports of the Potter County Health Department were
not within the law enforcement record exception.
122. The legislature intended that the provisions of TORA should be liberally con-
strued in favor of granting any request for information. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17a, § 14(d) (Supp. 1974).
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interesting problems will arise under TORA similar to those which have
been litigated under the Freedom of Information Act.
B. Investigatory Files Which Will Be Used in Litigation
Substantial case authority exists under the investigatory files exception to
the Freedom of Information Act which exempts from public disclosure
investigatory records which are being or will be used in an enforcement
proceeding prior to the time they would be available under discovery
methods. 12 In Clement Brothers Co. v. NLRB' 24 statements made by the
plaintiff's employee to a federal agency, which were to be used in an
enforcement action under the National Labor Relations Act, were not
subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 125 The court
based its decision on the theory that employees would be less likely to reveal
damaging information about their employers if their statements were freely
discoverable by employers;' 26 and, the regulatory investigation would thus
be significantly hampered. 127 The information would be available to the
plaintiffs only if the employees were called as witnesses.128
Similarly, in Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton129 the court refused to
compel disclosure of witnesses' statements obtained by the NLRB during
investigation of unfair labor practices prior to an enforcement hearing.' 30 In
the court's view, the congressional intent in enacting the Freedom of
Information Act was not to give private parties charged with violating
federal regulatory statutes greater access to investigatory records than has
been granted to a defendant charged with a criminal offense. 13  This
reasoning was adopted in Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 132 in
which it was held that the investigatory file exemption of the Freedom of
Information Act did not create an additional method of discovery in civil
cases,' 33 for the primary purpose of the Act was to avoid such premature
discovery of an agency's case. 134 Therefore, statements of witnesses and
agency deliberations or recommendations were exempt from disclosure."s5 A
rule for limited review of agency investigatory records prior to litigation was
123. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970); Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Neb. 1970); Clement Bros. v.
NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969); Bar-
celoneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
124. 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), alf'd, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969).




129. 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
130. Id. at 594.
131. Id. at 593. Under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), the statements
of a witness obtained during investigation of alleged criminal violations are not avail-
able to the opposing party until after the witness has given direct testimony against the
accused. For general provisions of criminal discovery, see FED. R. CiM. P. 16.
132. 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (wrongful death action involving a request
for an accident investigation report prepared by the Office of Occupational Safety, which
was not a party to the law suit).
133. Id. at 711. The scope of discovery in federal civil cases is governed by FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b); accord, Kerr v. U.S.N. Dist. Ct. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1975).
134. 288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
135. Id. at 718.
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adopted in B & C Tire Co. v. Commissioner,'8 6 where a taxpayer sought
records prepared by an IRS agent in connection with the plaintiff's tax
return. Although the liberal disclosure requirement of the Freedom of
Information Act was recognized, the records were exempted from disclo-
sure. 18 7 The court rejected the taxpayer's contention that the records were
not an investigatory file as the audit was conducted merely as a monitoring
activity and criminal prosecution was not contemplated. 138 In the court's
view, monitoring and prosecutorial activities both fall within the scope of the
investigatory files exemption and should not be disclosed since they are to be
used in litigation. 189
The Texas courts should follow the decisions under the Freedom of
Information Act on the issue of whether the law enforcement exemption of
TORA provides an additional method for discovery in enforcement proceed-
ings. There are compelling policy considerations of efficient investigatory
procedures which serve the public interest. The government agency must
conduct legitimate inquiries concerning possible violations of the law in
secrecy in order to competently perform its agency mission.' 40 Further, there
is no indication in the legislative history or the statutory language of TORA
to support the proposition that the legislature intended to displace the present
Texas procedure for discovery. 1 4 ' Under the present language of TORA the
Texas courts should hold that civil and criminal law enforcement agency
records, which are or will be used in litigation, should be exempt from
disclosure, if they are not discoverable.
C. Investigatory Files Which Will Not Be Used in Litigation
The federal courts do not agree on the question of whether investigatory
files, which will not be used in an enforcement proceeding, are subject to
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FTC 42 the plaintiff sought documents procured by an FTC staff investiga-
tion.' 48 In the court's view, an agency could not, consistent with the broad
disclosure mandate of the federal Act, automatically exempt all of its files
with the label "investigatory" and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings
might be launched at some future date.' 4 4 The Government must show a
prospect of future enforcement concrete enough to merit the agency's refusal
to disclose the information under the Freedom of Information Act. 145 This
rule did not, as reasoned by the court, offend the Act's policy against
premature disclosure of government documents to an adverse party.
136. 376 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
137. Id. at 711-14.
138. Id. at 713.
139. Id. at 714.
140. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
141. In Texas, the government is not required in criminal trials to produce for inspec-
tion by the accused the statements of witnesses prior to the trial. Bryant v. State, 397
S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (1966). For scope of
discovery and production of documents in a civil trial, see TEx. R. Crv. P. 167.
142. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
143. Id.




In Wellford v. Hardin148 the Bristol-Myers rationale was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit, the court finding that the underlying policies of the Act
demanded strict and narrow construction of the disclosure exemptions. 147
Records of past administrative enforcement proceedings were not under the
disclosure umbrella, as the purpose of the law enforcement files exemption
was merely to prevent premature discovery of the Government's case by the
defendant. 1 48
The recent case of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp.
149
followed the Bristol-Myers rule in a situation involving a Department of
Labor report which contained conclusions regarding the cause of an injury to
an employee of the plaintiff. 150 Although the Department of Labor asserted
that the files were investigatory, the court ruled that this was an insufficient
reason for confidentiality.' 51 The Government had the burden of showing
that the revelation of the material would result in a premature disclosure of
the Government's position in an enforcement proceeding or the agency's
investigatory techniques. 152 Since an enforcement proceeding involving the
Government was neither pending nor contemplated and the investigatory
methods employed by the Gowernment had been disclosed by other docu-
ments released by the department, the data was not protected by the
Freedom of Information Act.' 53
Similarly, in Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America'5 4 FBI documents were
not entitled to protection by the Freedom of Information Act, in that ten
years had elapsed since the records had been compiled, and a trial was not
reasonably foreseeable.' 55 Thus, the court ruled that the documents must be
disclosed. 1 6
Likewise, in M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC157 the court required the
Government to show that a law enforcement proceeding based on the
documents prepared in the agency's investigation of offboard trading activi-
ties was contemplated within the reasonably near future in order to protect
the agency records from disclosure.' 55 As six years had elapsed since the
investigation had begun, and the agency had failed to release any facts that
would show that proceedings were imminent, the exemption did not ap-
ply.' 59
The automatic disclosure rule was also rejected in Cooney v. Sun Ship-
146. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). See Note, Freedom of Information Act-Depart-
ment of Agriculture Must Disclose Detentions of Meat and Poultry Products and Warn-
ing Letters Sent to Processors, 85 H-lv. L. REv. 861 (1972).
147. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). Strict construction of Freedom of Information
Act's exemptions has been adopted by other courts. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
148. 444 F.2d at 23.
149. 508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 949.
153. Id.
154. 371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974).
155. Id. at 102.
156. Id.
157. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).




building & Drydock Co.,160 where, in the view of the court, the seventh
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act should not be applicable
when the investigation has ceased and the prospect of future law enforce-
ment proceedings is slim.' 6 '
Another line of authority holds that the exemption applies notwithstanding
-the fact that litigation has ceased or is not contemplated. In Cowles
Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice'62 a party to a libel suit
sought production of records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
on the theory that the records would not be used in any future enforcement
proceeding. 163 The court held that the federal Act protected from disclosure
investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes.'6 4 Under the
court's literal interpretation of the statute, it was irrelevant whether the
enforcement proceeding actually occurred or was even contemplated in terms
of the disclosure or non-disclosure issue.'6 5 Disclosure would reduce the
efficacy of agency investigations as informers would be less likely to give
information if their statements were not to be kept confidential.' 66 Since the
individual's right to privacy might be sacrificed, the court was hesitant to
hold that investigatory files which would not be used in litigation were
subject to disclosure. 167 In this instance, the policy values of privacy and
governmental efficiency, in the court's opinion, clearly outweighed the
public's need to know.' 68
Evans v. Department of Transportation6 9 involved an eleven-year-old
letter received by the defendant expressing the opinion that the plaintiff was
too mentally ill to fly.' 70 Because the document was characterized by the
court as part of an investigatory file, it was exempted from disclosure. The
court said that if disclosure was ordered after enforcement proceedings were
complete, few people would aid the Government in future investigations. 17
Similarly, in Frankel v. SEC' 72 the plaintiff's request for documents used
by the defendant in civil litigation against persons who were not parties to the
law suit was denied.' 73 The court noted that if the exemption did not apply
after the investigation and enforcement proceeding had terminated, future
law enforcement efforts would be less effective as the procedures for
obtaining information would be public knowledge.1 74 Thus, the plaintiff was
limited to the usual rules of discovery.' 75
160. 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
161. Id.
162. 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
163. Id. at 726.
164. Id. at 727.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 727.
168. Id.
169. 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1971).
170. Id. at 822-23.
171. ld. at 824.
172. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). See Note, Freedom
of Information Act-Investigatory Files Remain Exempt from Public Disclosure Even
After Agency Proceedings Have Terminated, 51 TaxAs L. REV. 119 (1972).
173. 460 F.2d at 818.
174. Id. at 817.
175. Id. at 818.
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A writer sought FBI records concerning the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy in Weisberg v. Department of Justice.170 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, concluded that as the
files were investigatory records prepared for law enforcement purposes they
were not subject to disclosure, despite the fact that enforcement proceedings
were not contemplated. 177
The plaintiff sought access to affidavits given 'by its employees to an
NLRB investigator in Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB." 8 In exempting
the documents from public disclosure, the Fourth Circuit ruled that since the
affidavits were procured to enforce the National Labor Relations Act,179
the information was gathered for law enforcement purposes. 8 0 The fact that
an unfair labor complaint had not been filed at the time the material was
obtained did not obviate the agency's privilege of confidentiality.' 81
The Department of Defense records concerning the adequacy of the
United States Army's investigation of the My Lai incident was the subject of
Aspin v. Department of Defense.' 82 Since there had been enforcement
proceedings based upon the report, the documents were privileged. 183 Based
on the policy of governmental efficiency, the exemption from disclosure
continues even after proceedings have ceased.' 84
This confidential per se rule was applied in Ditlow v. Brinegar'8 5 to the
records of the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminstration, because they
were collected during an investigation of automobile safety.' 86 Likelihood of
adjudication was not a decisive determinant in resolving the controversy.' 8 7
The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia further focused the test for
disclosure in Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agri-
culture. 88 The court held that the question to be addressed was: how and
under what circumstances were the files compiled?189 The Government must
merely show that the files were assembled for adjudicative or enforcement
purposes.' 90 Once this burden is met, the privilege of confidentiality contin-
ues, even when there is no longer any prospect for future enforcement
176. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See Com-
ment, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, WAsH.
U.L.Q. 463 (1974).
177. 489 F.2d at 1199. The court stated that they still adhered to disclosure in situa-
tions such as that in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970).
178. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
180. 490 F.2d at 430.
181. Id.
182. 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). These records are commonly referred to as the
Peers Commission Report.
183. Id. at 29. The court distinguished Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970), on this basis. See Note, The Investigatory
File Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act: The D.C. Circuit Abandons Bris-
tol-Myers, 42 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 869 (1974).
184. 491 F.2d at 30.
185. 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1975).
186. Id. at 1074.
187. Id.






The scope of the phrase "law enforcement purposes" was recently expand-
ed in Center for National Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v.
Weinberger.192  At issue were twenty-two active files involving HEW
review of public school discrimination and segregation practices. 193 The
court drew a sharp distinction between administrative and investigatory
files.' 94 Records are protected only when the agency's activities depart from
routine administrative matters and focus with special intensity upon a
particular party.' 95 Whether or not the agency has assumed an investigatory
posture is a judicial inquiry.'19
Although the HEW records in Weinberger'97 were protected by the
Freedom of Information Act, the court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General
Services Administration98 ruled that the plaintiff's affirmative action plans,
which had been submitted to the defendant as required by law, were
administrative records and subject to public disclosure.' 99 As the agency had
not focused directly upon specifically alleged illegal acts, the records were
not classified by the court as law enforcement. 200
The better rule, which should be adopted by Texas, is that the governmen-
tal body should assume the burden of proving that an enforcement proceed-
ing based on the requested documents will be conducted in the foreseeable
future. Documents should not be kept from the public view merely upon the
assertion by an agency that a file is labeled as a "detection and investigatory
file." If the agency meets this burden of proof, the information should be
exempt from disclosure, based upon the policy of need for governmental
secrecy in investigating possible violations of the law and preparing for
litigation based on such violations. However, if the governmental body fails
to sustain its burden of proof, the records should not be automatically
disclosed. In certain instances, the government's sources and investigatory
techniques and an individual's right to privacy must be protected. The
attorney general or the courts should make an in camera inspection of the
documents to balance the competing interests of the agency and affected
individuals and the public's need to be informed. A final determination of
whether the documents should be made public should turn on which interest
demands the most protection in the specific factual circumstance.
This approach is desirable because it protects the three underlying and
often conflicting policies of the individual's right to privacy, the government's
need for secrecy, and the public's right to be informed. A rule which
automatically denies public access based on the mere fact that a file is
labeled by state agencies as "investigatory" fails to follow the underlying
191. id.
192. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 373.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 375.
197. Id.





public disclosure policy of TORA. Additionally, an in camera inspection of
the documents to balance the competing interests protects the individual's
right to privacy and the government's desire to exempt documents from
disclosure. Therefore, the Texas Legislature should amend TORA to set
forth explicitly the legislative policy on this matter, or the courts should
adopt such a rule in interpreting TORA.
D. Investigatory Files to Which Opposing Parties Have Access
There is authority for the proposition that investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes are not exempt from disclosure under the Free-
dom of Information Act where the parties to the proceedings have copies of
or access to such files. 2 0 1 This rule does not offend the underlying policy of
the exemption, which is to enhance the effectiveness of the government's
enforcement efforts. 20 2 The exemption is designed to prevent disclosure of
investigatory files prior to the time that an adverse litigant might otherwise
obtain them.203 If the party opposing the government in litigation has access
to or is in possession of such files, there is no longer a reason for exempting
the files from public disclosure. 20 4 Only the government may assert the
privilege. 20 5 Once an opposing party obtains a document, the right of
secrecy does not inure to that party.2 06 This rule is based upon sound
reasoning and public policy and should be applied to the law enforcement
records section of TORA. Assuming that there is not an invasion of any
individual's right of privacy, the public's right to know should prevail, as the
government does not have a legitimate need for governmental secrecy.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The underlying policy of the Texas Open Records Act for openness in
government is laudable. In fact, it is essential in a democratic society that the
public have access to the records of its government in order to assess fully
the management of its public affairs. However, equally compelling policy
goals of the individual's right to privacy and the government's need for
secrecy are often overlooked by commentators and lawmakers in discussing
open record laws. Accommodations and compromises must be made by the
legislature and the courts in order to protect these three valuable precepts.
Based upon the foregoing analysis of the investigatory files exception to
disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act, which illustrates the collision
of legitimate policy considerations, several recommendations are proposed:
First, the legislature should explicitly state whether the law enforcement
records exception encompasses the numerous civil regulatory agencies of
201. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); La Morte v. Mansfield, 438
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971); Legal Aid Society v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
202. Legal Aid Society v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
203. Id. at 777.
204. Id,
205. La Morte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971).
206. Id. at 451.
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Texas. Although there is some legislative history to support an affirmative
response, an amendment to the Texas Open Records Act would conclusively
resolve this issue. It is urged that the legislature adopt the position that
regulatory agencies are included within the umbrella of the law enforcement
records exemption because they perform an important role in the enforce-
ment of the state's laws. As such, their records should be protected from
public revelation when it serves the public interest. Additionally, these
agencies possess information which must be concealed from the public when
disclosure would constitute an invasion of privacy. However, the veil of
secrecy must be removed where the public's need to know is greater than
that of the government's or individual's need for confidentiality.
Second, the Texas Open Records Act should be amended in order to
clarify the relationship between the law enforcement exemption and enforce-
ment proceedings. It is strongly recommended that Texas adopt the rule that
investigatory files are automatically exempt from disclosure if the govern-
mental body can show that an enforcement proceeding is either pending or
imminent. This rule promotes the effective enforcement of state laws.
However, if the government fails to meet its burden of proof, then an in
camera inspection of the records should be made by the attorney general or
the courts to balance the competing policy interests of individual privacy,
governmental secrecy, and the public's right to know.
Finally, the case law and attorney general's opinions should be continually
monitored by the legislature and the public in order to determine whether
any policy objectives are being unreasonably sacrificed. If so, immediate
legislative action should be taken to correct the situation.
By enacting TORA, the State of Texas has entered into a new era of
openness and honesty in government. However, policy goals are not talis-
men; the machinery and guidelines for public disclosure must be continually
fine-tuned to assure just results in opening the records of government to the
people of Texas.
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